UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-8-2013

State v. Anderson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40222

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Anderson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 40222" (2013). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4156.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4156

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

)
)

)
)

v,

)
)
)
)
)

District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720·0010

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

(208) 334-4534

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8712
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, 10 83703

(208) 334-2712
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF AUTHORITI
STATEMENT
Nature of

THE

..... iii

.......................................... " ....... " ..................... 1
....................... " .................................................... 1

Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ........................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................. 9
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 10
I.

District Court Abused
Discretion When It
Permit Mr. Anderson To Withdraw His Guilty Plea ................... " ........... 10
A. Introduction...... .......... .....

.. ........................................................... 10

A Just Reason Existed To Withdraw Mr. Anderson's
Guilty Plea ......................................................................................... 12
1. Mr. Anderson's Guilty Plea Was Rendered Involuntary
By The Combination of Family Pressure and Severe
Depression He Felt At The Time He Entered The Plea ............... 12
2. The Combination of Family Pressure And Severe
Depression Provided A Just Reason To Withdraw
The Plea ........................................................................................ 16
C. Permitting Mr. Anderson to Withdraw His Plea Would
Not Have Prejudiced The State ......................................................... 17
II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A

Unified Sentence Of Forty Years, With Fifteen Years Fixed,
Upon Mr. Anderson Following His Plea Of Guilty To Lewd
Conduct
........................................................................................... 18
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 18
B. Mr. Anderson's Sentence Is Excessive Considering Any View
Of The Facts, Because The District Court Did Not Give
Adequate Consideration To Mitigating Factors .................................. 19

CONCLUSION. ............................................... .......................... ...................... 20
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING '" ..................................................................... 21

ii

v. Akin, 139 Idaho 1

v
v.

(Ct. App. 2003) ............................................. 11, 16
(1990) ................................................... '10,16

117 Idaho
'1

Idaho

'1(1

v. Hans/ovan, 147

.................................................. 1·1,1·1

530 (Ct. App.

.. .................................. passim

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293 (1997) .......................................................... 18
State v. Oliver, '144 Idaho
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho
v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho
State

Stone, 1

Idaho

n.1 (2007) .................................................. 18
1 (Ct. App. 1982) .............................................. 18
(Ct. App. 1990) .............................. 11, '16
(Ct. App. 2009) ................................................ 11

State v. Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................................. 13

Statutes
I.C. § 19-2523(1) ................................................................................................ 19

Additional Authorities
21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 605 & 606 ........................................................ 13

iii

forty-three-year~old

Pursuant to a plea
guilty to felony

\f\/ayne 0,

, II

conduct with a child under

subsequently filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to withdraw his
which the district court denied.

Mr. Anderson then filed a motion to reconsider the

district couri's order denying the withdrawal of his guilty

which the district court

denied. The district court imposed a unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen
years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Anderson

that the district court abused its discretion

when it did not permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. Mr. Anderson also

that

the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer James of the Nampa Police Department was dispatched to a sex offense
call in Nampa.

(presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)

Child

Protective Services had advised that a family member of thirteen-year-old C.A called to
report that Mr. Anderson, C.A's father, had been sexually offending against C.A (PSI,
p.2.)
Officers contacted Cassie Anderson, C.A's mother and Mr. Anderson's wife.
(PSI, pp.2-3.) Mrs. Anderson stated that her oldest daughter, E.A., had told her that
Mr. Anderson had touched C.A (PSI, p.2.) C.A. had stated that Mr. Anderson had put
his hand in her underwear and touched her buttocks while she was sleeping. (PSI, p.2;
Tr., Apr. 16, 2012, p.12, Ls.11-24.)

C.A. reportedly stated that it was the only time

Mr. Anderson sexually abused her. (PSI, p.2.)
1

Anderson had also

with seventeen-year-old D.A., her other

(PSI, p .) D.A. reported that Mr. Anderson had
and in the pants several times in the past few months.

touching her on the
(PSI, p.2.)

When

confronted Mr. Anderson about it, he admitted to touching the girls and
to commit suicide.
later, C.A.

I,

.)

D.A. were interviewed at

C.A. stated that sometime during the

I,

put his

school

down her pants and underwear while she was

living room. (PSI, p. ) D.A. stated that Mr. Anderson had
when they were living in a trailer park in

her

Justice
Mr. Anderson had
on the couch in
messing with
they moved to

Nampa, he progressed to touching her breasts on top on her clothes and then under her
shirt and bra.

(PSI, p.2.)

A few months after Mr. Anderson began touching D.A.'s

breasts, he reportedly started to place his hand on her crotch, and then later put his
hand down her pants and underwear to engage in manual-genital stimulation.

(PSI,

p.2.) D.A. stated that Mr. Anderson at one time pulled up her shirt and pulled down her
pants and underwear while she was sleeping on the couch. (PSI, p.2.) D.A told him to
stop, but Mr. Anderson begged her to do it again. (PSI, p.2.) D.A began sleeping with
the light on, and threatened to scream. (PSI, p.2.)
When officers went to interview Mr. Anderson, they interrupted him while he was
in the process of taking his own life.

(Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.9-11.) Officers later

interviewed Mr. Anderson, who stated that he had touched D.A's breasts and genitals
multiple times, both over the clothes and skin to skin. (PSI, p.2.) He reportedly stated
that he had been "grooming" D.A from when she was about thirteen or fourteen, before
they moved to Nampa from Eagle. (PSI, pp.2-3.) He denied any additional incidents

2

with his oldest daughter,

(PSI, p.3.)

Shortly after his interview with the police,

Mr. Anderson was hospitalized in a mental facility for several days. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012,

County No. CR

In

11-31

Mr. Anderson was charged, for the

D.A., with one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
in violation of Idaho Code § 18-1508,
the

of

one count of sexual abuse of a child under

years, in violation of I.C. § 18-1506.

(R., pp.6-7.)

Additionally,

Mr. Anderson was charged with two mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements
to I.

§ 19-2520G(2), on account of his conviction for
on September 24, 1998 in

minor under

conduct with a

Lake County, and his being

required to register as a sex offender pursuant to I.C. § 18-8304. (R., pp.8-9.) The
victim of the prior lewd conduct was E.A.

(PSI, p.3.)

The district court ordered

Mr. Anderson to have no contact with D.A. and all minors. (R., p.16.) Mr. Anderson
initially entered pleas of not guilty and denied the sentencing enhancements. (R., p.20.)
No. CR 2011-31445*C was also consolidated with Canyon County No. CR 201121567*C. 1 (R., p.69.)
Mr. Anderson later entered into a plea agreement with the State. (R, pp.70-71.)
Under the plea agreement, Mr. Anderson would plead guilty to the lewd conduct charge
and the related I.C. § 19-2520G(2) sentencing enhancement requiring a 15-year
mandatory minimum sentence in No. CR 2011-31445*C. (R, p.71; Tr., Feb. 14, 2012,
p.6, Ls.17-22.)

In exchange, the State would dismiss the sexual abuse charge and

related sentencing enhancement in No. CR 2011-31445*C, and dismiss No. CR 2011-

1 In No. CR 2011-21567*C, Mr. Anderson was charged, for the allegations regarding
C.A. (see R, pp.58-59), with one count of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen and a
mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement (PSI, p.4; R, pp.22, 28-29, 98).

3

21

in its entirety.

would recommend imposing a

1.)

would include

with the indeterminate portion of the
Anderson would enter an Alford plea.

open for
(R.,

inquiries as to the

1.)

and related sentencing enhancement]

Alford pleas of guilty [to
and voluntary

district court then

it told

you are entering your

that

of your own

of the

" (Tr., Feb. 1

201

p.24,

1

Mr. Anderson's Afford plea. (R., p.75; Tr., Feb. 1

201

Ls.22~24.)

Prior to sentencing, Mr.
withdraw his guilty plea.

an Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) motion to

(R.,

motion stated that "[t]he day prior to

changing his plea, Defendant spoke to his wife who unduly, and perhaps unlawfully,
persuaded Defendant to plead guilty in these matters thus making his change of plea
not freely and voluntarily done." (R., p.B4.)
Mr. Anderson also filed an affidavit in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. (R., pp.90-93.) In the affidavit, Mr. Anderson stated, "I will do almost anything in
order to fulfill the wishes of my wife."

(R., p.91.)

Mr. Anderson related that, in a

video/phone conversation with Mrs. Anderson before the change of plea, "I tried to
explain to my wife that I was 'fighting for my life.' . .. In response, my wife told me to
'stop trying to save my life' and that I was harming our children.

She also made it

absolutely clear that she wanted me to plead guilty." (R., p.91.) Mr. Anderson stated
that "[a]s a result of hearing my wife tell me that she did not want me to live anymore, I

2

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

4

was completely devastated mentally and emotionally. . ..
guilty so I could fulfill my wife's wishes

die in prison." (R., pp.91-92.)

At the change of plea hearing, "still

about what my

" Mr. Anderson "merely

the
In

a

I decided that I was going to

had told me

questions presented to me by the

that I thought

I was

judge taking

focused on giving the judge truthful answers."

(R., p.92.)

Mr. Anderson entered his Alford plea, he

truly reflect upon

About a
understand

what I had done," and came to realize "that I had acted in haste, and while under the
influence of

pain and grief caused by what my wife had said to me.
district court held a hearing on

, p.92.)

motion to withdraw the guilty plea.

(R., p.86.) At the hearing, Mr. Anderson's counsel

that when Mr. Anderson

submitted his change of plea, "essentially, that was not a knowingly and voluntary plea.
He was under the influence of what his wife had told him. He was deeply depressed."
(Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.1-4.)
The State argued that the district court had asked Mr. Anderson whether anyone
had tried to pressure him into changing his plea, and Mr. Anderson indicated that had
not happened.

(Tr., Apr. 9, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.3.)

Further, the State argued that

"when you're looking at voluntariness and you're looking at whether or not an individual
was coerced into a change of plea, that is typically associated with State action."
(Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.11, Ls.5-B.) According to the State, "[Mr. Anderson's] wife is not a
State actor, his wife is not an individual who was acting at the State's direction in an
effort to get him to change his plea." (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.11, Ls.13-15.) Thus, the State

5

Anderson had

that
, Apr.

2012, p.1

recording

of

L.23
the

shown
p.1

.

(R., p.9S.)

[Mr. Anderson]

L.1.)

video/phone

held a

had

cause to

his guilty plea.

The district court

review a copy of

conversation

hearing on

"'6/'A"

to

Anderson's

guilty
giving

when he was deciding

or

"his interpretation based on his affidavit was, you know what, you need to plead
guilty.

You need

,Apr. 16, 201
talked about I'm going

stop fighting.

You know, you're going to go

) Mr. Anderson's
go to prison. My life is going to

prison:'

continued: "[Mr. Anderson)
over. And his wife basically

says, no, it's not. ,Just plead guilty." (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.4, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Anderson's
counsel asserted that Mr. Anderson, at the change of plea hearing, "just went through
the motions, said what he felt everyone wanted to hear so he can get it over with. But in
reality he's reacting to this emotional situation .... " (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.4, Ls.17-20.)
The State argued that "just simply because something is emotional doesn't mean
that it rises to the level of such duress that somebody would enter a change of plea and
that it would not be knowing and voluntary." (Tr., Apr. 16,2012, p.5, Ls.17-21.) Further,
the State related that Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson: "Nobody wants you to die.
Your family supports you. Your family loves you. We just want you to, you know, not
hurt everybody in the process." (Tr., Apr. 16, 2012, p.7, Ls.17-20.) The State also

3 The State also mentioned that Mr. Anderson had sent a letter to Mrs. Anderson
instructing C.A and D.A to change their stories. (Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.12, Ls.15-19.)
The district court had previously indicated that the letter would be admissible evidence.
(Tr., Apr. 9,2012, p.12, Ls.20-24.)

6

that Mr. Anderson was familiar with the criminal court
Anderson was not a

"""'TOleYl

actor. (Tr., Apr. 16,201

p.6,

p.8, L.1.) The district court took the matter under
a written decision. (R.,
days later,

ITOr'HQri

that

7, L.25

indicated it would

96.)
district court

its

Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw his guilty
"As

and

(R.,

by the Idaho [Court of Appeals] in

um

pp.97~101.)

on

The district court

v. Hans/ovan, [1

Idaho 530,

537 -38 (Ct. App. 2008)], anxiety and pressure from the defendant's family (here
Defendant's wife)

not constitute impermissible coercion." (R., pp.100-01.) The

district court concluded
pleading guilty by his

Defendant was not unduly or unlawfully coerced into
" (R., p.i 01.) Further, "an assertion of innocence, by itself, is

not grounds to withdraw a guilty plea." (R.,

101.) Thus, the district court denied the

motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (R., p.i01.)
Mr. Anderson subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the district court's order
denying the withdrawal of his guilty plea. (R., pp.i05-07.) In the motion, Mr. Anderson
asserted that he was "severely depressed" after talking to his wife before the change of
plea hearing, and was still depressed when he entered his Alford plea. (R., pp.i05-06.)
He also asserted that the district court did not adequately question him as to his mental
and emotional state when he entered the guilty plea, and his guilty plea was not freely,
knowingly, or voluntarily made because he "was under undue mental duress and severe
depression."

(R., p.i06.)

The district court indicated that its analysis in the

memorandum decision denying the motion to withdraw a guilty plea was just as
applicable to the motion to reconsider, and denied Mr. Anderson's motion to reconsider.
(R., p.i 09.)

7

the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court
unified

of life imprisonment, with

mandatory minimum of fifteen years

(R, p.11 0.) Mr. Anderson's counsel
of
a unified

with

riTTr""rI

that the district court impose
fixed.

(R, p.'110.) The district
4

years, with

, pp.11

1
Anderson filed a timely

of Appeal.

11

.)

The district court also ordered that Mr. Anderson would have no contact with D.A. and
C.A. until July 16, 2052. (R., p.118.)

4

8

1.

Did the district court abuse
withdraw his guilty plea?

discretion

it did not permit Mr. Anderson to

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
fOliy
with fifteen
fixed, upon Mr. Anderson following his plea of guilty
lewd conduct?

9

I.

A.

its d
permit

The

to

standard of review for

of

Court of

motion to withdraw a guilty

when it
has outlined
made, as in this

prior to sentencing:
Idaho Criminal
governs the withdrawal of guilty
granting or denial of such a motion is within the discretion the trial court
V\/hen the motion is made before the pronouncement of sentence, such
discretion should
liberally exercised.
Before sentencing, the
inconvenience to the court and prosecution resulting from a change of
plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting the right of the accused
to trial by jury. Presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic
right; the defendant has the burden of showing a "just reason" exists to
withdraw the plea. We review the decision of the trial court for an abuse
of discretion. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine:
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Appellate review of the denial of a
motion to withdraw a plea is limited to whether the district court exercised
sound judicial discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.
State v. Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

As

discussed above, when a withdrawal of a plea is sought before sentencing, the district
court's "discretion should be liberally exercised." State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298
(1990).

But even if granting the motion would not prejudice the State, a motion to

withdraw a plea may be denied if the defendant has not presented and supported a

10

"plausible reason for withdrawal

the plea."

State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 162

(Ct App. 2003).
A just reason for permitting
Hans/ovan, 1

involuntary.

"A threshold question is whether the

and voluntarily

of guilty was
Idaho 957, 959
Id.

withdrawal of a guilty plea exists if the plea is

plea was not taken in compliance with constitutional due

process standards, which require

a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly, and
established as a matter of

intelligency, then . . . 'just
Idaho 330, 333 (Ct.

plea is not

118

must be granted if the plea is

In other words, "[i]f

Stone, 1

" State v.

in order to

2009).

" State v.

"However, a constitutional

in the

... a 'just reason.'" Id. If the appellate court on

review determines that the guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made,
it then proceeds to determine whether any other "just reason" exists for withdrawal of
the plea. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959.
A court determines whether a plea is entered voluntarily and knowingly through a
three-part inquiry involving:
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he
understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to
confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself;
and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of
pleading guilty.

State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 484 (1993).

"On appeal, Idaho law requires that

voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must be reasonably inferred from the record
as a whole." Id.
In this case, the district court concluded that Mr. Anderson was not unduly or
unlawfully coerced into pleading guilty by his wife, and thus denied his motion to
11

withdraw his guilty
it

(R, p.101.)

district court

Anderson's motion to

that

in the

decision denying the

motion to withdraw a guilty plea was just
(R,

to

motion to

'109.)
under

withdrawal of a guilty
withdrawing the
a just reason
his
its discretion

a

applicable

should
the plea,

if a just reason
not prejud

1

if

Idaho at

Permitting Mr. Anderson

to withdraw
would not

Thus, the district court

it did not permit

the district court did not act consistently with

to withdraw his guilty
applicable legal

A Just Reason Existed To Withdraw Mr. Anderson's Guilty Plea
Mr. Anderson asserts that a just reason existed to withdraw his guilty plea. A just
reason existed to withdraw Mr. Anderson's plea because his plea was rendered
involuntary by the combination of family pressure and severe depression he felt at the
time he entered the plea. Alternatively, even if Mr. Anderson's plea was not rendered
involuntary, the combination of family pressure and severe depression still provided a
just reason to withdraw the plea.

1.

Mr. Anderson's Guilty Plea Was Rendered Involuntary By The
Combination of Family Pressure and Severe Depression He Felt At The
Time He Entered The Plea

Mr. Anderson asserts that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary by the
combination of family pressure and severe depression he felt at the time he entered the

12

a just reason for permitting the

As
if the

is involuntary.

Hans/ovan, 1

of a guilty

Idaho

In support of the original motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Anderson
that his plea was involuntary
his wife, Mrs. Anderson. (R, pp.91
encouraged the

.) Additionally, Mr.

when he

court to grant the original motion

stated that Mr. Anderson
(Tr., Apr. 9, 201

to plead guilty by

deeply

withdraw the guilty
the

p.8, L.4.) in his motion to reconsider, Mr. Anderson asserted that he

was suffering from severe depression

the time he entered the guilty plea.

(R, pp.1 05-06.)

A plea of guilty is involuntary if the
Hanslovan, 1

Idaho

was coerced to plead guilty.

537. "If an innocent would have felt compelled to plead guilty

in light of the circumstances, it can properly be said that the plea was involuntary." Id.
"A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly induced by ignorance,
fear or fraud." Id. However, it is well-established that "anxiety and pressure from the
defendant's family situation do not constitute impermissible coercion," because such
family pressure is "not attributable to the state." Id. at 537-38.
Further, a defendant's mental health issues, such as severe depression, may
leave the defendant mentally incompetent to enter a guilty plea and thus make any plea
entered by the defendant involuntary. See 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §§ 605 & 606;

see also Dopp, 124 Idaho at 483-84 ("Oopp has asserted that because he was under
severe emotional stress prior to entering his guilty pleas, he did not enter those pleas
voluntarily."), State v. Wilhelm, 135 Idaho 111, 115 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Wilhelm argues
that he pleaded guilty in reliance upon certain misrepresentations made by the district
13

and that the district court failed to inquire properly into his
. ..

the

Wilhelm was

to

psychiatric care for manic

deficit disorder.").
In

filed in suppori of the motion

Anderson

his

conversation

him to plead guilty,
(R., pp.91

withd raw the

emotionally
Mr.

entered his guilty

and
while he

this family

from Ms. Anderson, because he was still distraught from his conversation with
his wife. (R., p.92.) As Mr. Anderson's counsel put it during the first hearing on the
motion to withdraw the guilty plea, "[Mr. Anderson] was under the influence of what his
had told him." At the second hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea,
. Anderson's counsel further asseried that Mr. Anderson, at the change of plea
hearing, "just went through the motions, said what he felt everyone wanted to hear so
he can get it over with.

But in reality he's reacting to this emotional situation .... "

(Tr., Apr. 16,2012, pA, Ls.17-20.) Thus, Mr. Anderson demonstrated that he felt family
pressure from his wife, Ms. Anderson, when he entered the plea.
In his motion to reconsider, Mr. Anderson asserted that he was "severely
depressed" after talking to his wife before the change of plea hearing, and was still
depressed when he entered his plea. (R., pp.105-06.) While Mr. Anderson was never
formally diagnosed with a mental illness, his attempt to take his own life and mental hold
demonstrate that severe depression, in the words of his counsel, was "very real for
him." (Tr., July 16, 2012, pA, Ls.11-19; see Tr., Apr. 9, 2012, p.8, Ls.9-11.) Further,
Mr. Anderson's counsel stated that after Mrs. Anderson told Mr. Anderson to plead
guilty, "[i]t increased his depression. And so when he is in front of [the district court] the

14

moming

his plea, giving away all his rights, he was not in the right

mind." (Tr., July 1

2012,

Ls.1'l-'14.) Mr. Anderson

that,

, "I saw no purpose in my life. And for a long time while I was in here I
" (Tr., July 1
in a frame of
you're in

2012, p.9, L24

p.10, L,2.) He

where you

to kill yourself, can you really

right frame of mind, that you're making the right
(Tr., July '1

he was severely
Anderson

Thus, Mr.
<lTOren

that his guilty
and severe

combination of family
Admittedly, family
plea involuntary,

'12, p.10,
the time he

district court,

for yourself
demonstrated

the plea.
was rendered involuntary by
he felt at the time he

alone does not constitute coercion that would make a

Hans/ovan, 1

Idaho at 537-38. However, the family

exerted on Mr. Anderson by his wife was not the only factor that influenced his entering
a guilty plea. Mr. Anderson was also suffering from severe depression at the time he
entered the plea. Indeed, when Ms. Anderson pressured Mr. Anderson to plead guilty
during their conversation, "[i]t increased his depression." (Tr., July 16, 2012, p.5, Ls.1114.)

He was still under a cloud of family pressure and severe depression when he

entered the guilty plea.

(R., pp.91-92, 105-06.) This combination of family pressure

and severe depression left Mr. Anderson unable to enter a voluntary plea, and his guilty
plea was therefore involuntary. Thus, a just reason existed for withdrawal of the plea
because the combination of family pressure and severe depression rendered
Mr. Anderson's guilty plea involuntary.

15

that even if his
withdraw the plea.

if the combination of family

and

the time he entered the plea did not render the

Anderson

severe

was not involuntary,

involuntary, it

a just reason to withdraw the

previously

, under the applicable

of discretion

, if an

appellate court on review determines that a guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily
for

it then

determine whether any other "just
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at

the district court's "discretion

withdrawal of
exercised."

When a

117 Idaho

the
liberally

298. "Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the

court and prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to
protecting the right of the accused to trial by jury." Hans/ovan, 147 Idaho at 535.
Mr. Anderson submits that, even if the combination of family pressure and severe
depression he felt at the time did not render the plea involuntary, it nonetheless
provided a just reason to withdraw the plea.

By bringing the combination of family

pressure and severe depression to the district court's attention, alongside evidence of
that family pressure and severe depression, Mr. Anderson presented and supported a
"plausible reason for withdrawal of the plea." See Akin, 139 Idaho at 162. Again, the
standard for granting the withdrawal of pleas prior to sentencing is a liberal one. See
Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 298. Thus, even if Mr. Anderson's plea was not involuntary, a

just reason existed to withdraw the plea.
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Anderson

that permitting him to withdraw his guilty
the State.

not

If a defendant shows that

"may avoid the granting of

of

1

Idaho

prejudice

Anderson's guilty

Apr. 1

for

motion by

of the
did not

just reason

would

from

201

Li5

L.i0.)

Additionally, the district court did not conclude that permitting Mr. Anderson to withdraw
the

would prejudice the State.

I

pp.98~i 01.)

Rather, the district court only

determined that Mr. Anderson had not shown that a just reason existed to
plea. (R.,

pp.98~101.)

Thus, permitting Mr. Anderson to withdraw his

his
would not

have prejudiced the
In sum, a just reason existed to grant Mr. Anderson's motion to withdraw the
guilty plea. Permitting him to withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the State.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it did not permit Mr. Anderson to
withdraw his guilty plea, because the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards. Mr. Anderson's conviction should be vacated and his case
should be remanded with direction to permit Mr. Anderson to withdraw his plea of guilty.
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II.

Mr. Anderson

district court

a unified

of forty

considering any

of the

its discretion when it imposed

fifteen

the

is

Where a defendant contends that the

court imposed an excessively

the appellate court will conduct an independent

harsh

giving consideration to the nature of the

of

record,

character of the offender, and
103 Idaho

protection of the public interest.
"A defendant challenging his or her

1 (Ct. App. 1

on appeal need not show special

circumstances in order for the appellate court to review the entire sentence, including
the indeterminate portion." State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 n:l (2007).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979».
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Mr. Anderson does not allege

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Anderson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
individual

and

the

public generally;

(3)

18

the

possibility

of rehabilitation;

and

(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.
any

Id.

Mr.

his

of

Mr. Anderson submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by
considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Mr. Anderson's military
i'Jational Guard from 19B7 to 1
, p.B.)

was

court is

Mr. Anderson

in the Army

served full-time in the Army from 1
Crewman

to 1

had been given leadership training.

(PSI, p.B.) At the end of his service, he was honorably discharged.

(PSI, p.B.) As

Mr. Anderson's counsel noted, "[Mr. Anderson] served successfully in the military."
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.21, Ls.7-B.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Anderson's military
service should have resulted in a lesser sentence.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Anderson's mental
health issues. A district court must consider evidence of a defendant's mental condition
offered at the time of sentencing.

See I.C. § 19-2523(1).

As described above,

Mr. Anderson asserted that he was suffering from severe depression. At the sentencing
hearing, Mr. Anderson's counsel again directed the district court's attention to the facts
that Mr. Anderson had attempted suicide and had been placed in a mental health ward.
(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.23, Ls.8-19.)

Mr. Anderson's counsel also mentioned that

Mr. Anderson had been advised to seek mental health treatment, and "while he is
incarcerated hopefully he would get some mental health treatment, and that will also
help him to be a better citizen, a better person, and less of a threat to the community
19

(Tr., July 16, 2012, p.23, L.17
r. Anderson mental health

should

the district court did

that

Adequate

resulted in a

the

is ex(;es
Anderson

p.24, LA.)

mitigating

considering

Thus,

district court abused its

the

sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed. Mr.

the above reasons, Mr. Anderson respectfully

should

that this

his judgment of conviction and remand the case with direction to permit him to withdraw
of guilty,

Alternatively, Mr. Anderson respectfully

that this Court

reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2013.

BEN PATRICK
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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